The Supreme Court may have set a trap for conservative Christians that could backfire

This is the fundamentalist Christian nationalist religious majority trying hard to find a reason that violating any religion not christianity was OK.ย  ย They do not deny that the man’s religious beliefs were violated and ignored even after the courts had ruled to protect them.ย  That shows a bias against the non-Christian religions.ย  The SCOTUS has no qualms lying and using false misleading inform to create ruling in favor of the Christian religion and those that want to push / force it on to everyone else in the country.ย  ย Hugs

https://www.alternet.org/supreme-court-backfire/

The Supreme Court may have set a trap for conservative Christians that could backfire
Chip Somodevilla/Pool via REUTERS

For more than two decades, the Supreme Court has issued a long series of wins for plaintiffs seeking to protect their religious practices. On June 23, 2026, though, the majority delivered an uncommon defeat in this contentious area.

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Public Education and Safety, a 6-3 judgment, rejected the claim of Damon Landor, a Rastafarian whose hair was forcibly shaved in prison. Landor hadย worn long dreadlocksย for almost 20 years as an expression of his beliefs โ€“ part of a biblical practice known asย the โ€œNazarite vow.โ€ Like lower court judges, the Supreme Court did not dispute that officials violated Landorโ€™s rights. However, the high courtโ€™s majority ruled that he could not sue individual officials at the prison.

The case stands out for at least three other reasons.

First, Landor v. Louisiana underscores the complexity and far-reaching nature of religious freedom laws in the United States and the increasingly diverse faith traditions to which they apply. Christians now representย 62% of the American population, down from 78% in 2007, while 29% have no religious affiliation and 7% belong to other faith traditions.

Second, Landorโ€™s case gained support from many groups typically at odds over how to protect religious freedoms โ€“ groupsย disappointed withย this weekโ€™s decision.

Finally, the case highlights the religious rights of theย nearly 2 million peopleย in U.S. prisons, jails and detention and correctional facilities โ€“ and the challenge of holding their public employees accountable when those rights are violated.

Religious vow

Landor wasย incarcerated in Louisiana in 2020ย for possessing methamphetamine, cocaine, amphetamine and marijuana.

At first, officials respected his religious practice. Just three years earlier, a federal appeals court affirmed that Rastafarian inmatesย must be allowed to keep their dreadlocksย under a federal law passed in 2000:ย the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

Toward the end of his sentence, Landor was transferred to a different correctional facility in the state. There โ€“ with three weeks left for Landor to serve โ€“ the wardenย ignored the judicial order, directing guards to shackle Landor and forcibly shave his head.

After finishing his sentence, Landor filed suit for money damages under theย Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The act forbids the government and its officials from imposing โ€œsubstantial burden(s)โ€ on incarcerated peopleโ€™sย First Amendment rightย to the free exercise of religion. It also protects religious groups from discrimination through zoning restrictions.

Journey through the courts

In 2022, aย federal trial court in Louisianaย condemned Landorโ€™s treatment but rejected his claim, concluding that money damages were not an appropriate remedy under the act.

The following year, theย 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appealsย โ€œemphatically condemn(ed) the treatment that Landor endured.โ€ However, the panel unanimously affirmed the lower courtโ€™s decision, based onย its earlier rulingย that plaintiffs cannot sue government officials in their individual capacities for monetary damages โ€“ only the institution.

Landorโ€™s attorneys then sought an โ€œen bancโ€ hearing. In thisย uncommon procedure, parties seek further review by all of the judges in a federal circuit. The courtย denied this request, asย a majority of judges in the circuit wroteย that this was a question for the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Courtย agreed to hear an appealย after a variety of organizations,ย including the federal government, submittedย amicus curiae, or โ€œfriend of the court,โ€ briefs in favor of Landor. These includedย Americans United for Separation of Church and State, for example, which typically supports plaintiffs wishing to keep religion out of public life. They also includedย the Becket Fund, which usually represents people seeking to increase faithโ€™s role in public life, andย the Trump administration.

At issue was not whether Landorโ€™s rights had been violated but whether he could sue an individual official, namely the warden, for monetary damages. During oral arguments on Nov. 10, 2025, theย Supreme Court seemed skeptical.

Legal dilemma

That skepticism was reflected inย the courtโ€™s ultimate ruling. It was essentially a procedural ruling about the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act rather than a judgment on the merits of Landorโ€™s religious freedom claim.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Ketanji Brown Jacksonโ€™s dissent was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.

The majorityโ€™s argument that Landor could not sue centered on theย spending clauseย of the U.S. Constitution โ€“ the source of Congressโ€™ authority to create the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The spending clause allows the legislature to spend money to provide for the โ€œgeneral Welfare of the United States.โ€ If a state or institution uses federal funds, their officials agree to certain conditions; if they violate those conditions, Congress can remove funding.

But the spending clause does not give Congress authority to hold individual employees accountable, Gorsuch argued in his 18-page opinion. Prison officials had not โ€œvoluntarily and knowingly consentedย to answer private suitsโ€ under the act, and so they could not be held directly liable for monetary damages. Otherwise, Congress would have โ€œeffectively unbridled police power.โ€

Jacksonโ€™s 29-page dissent disagreed with the majorityโ€™s interpretation of the spending clause. The ruling, she contended, โ€œjettisons โ€˜a long line of this Courtโ€™s precedentsโ€™โ€ under which โ€œCongress has been able to use its spending power to reach beyond direct recipients of federal funds.โ€ As such, she worried that the courtโ€™s order imposed a โ€œnovel consent requirement.โ€

Jackson also lamented the decisionโ€™s potential consequences for inmates. Although the goal of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act was to protect prisonersโ€™ faith practices, she worried that people โ€œlike Landorย who suffer violations of their religious freedomย in state prisons โ€“ no matter how blatant โ€“ will often be left remediless.โ€

Bigger picture

At a glance, the Landor case appears to be a procedural disagreement rather than one over religious freedom.

However, I argue Landor v. Louisiana must be viewed as a setback for religious liberty, raising a serious question about whether minority faiths have as much protection under the First Amendment as larger religions. The decision is also something of a surprise to me, because the Supreme Court has recently upheld free exercise rights in multiple high-profile cases, almost all of which involve Christianity โ€“ such as aย football coachโ€™s ability to prayย on the field after public school games.

Portions of this article originally appeared inย a previous articleย published on Nov. 6, 2025.The Conversation

Charles J. Russo, Joseph Panzer Chair in Education and Research Professor of Law,ย University of Dayton

This article is republished fromย The Conversationย under a Creative Commons license. Read theย original article.